In this paper we investigate a game of optimal stopping with incomplete information. There are two players of which only one is informed about the precise structure of the game. Observing the informed player the uninformed player is given the possibility to guess the missing information. We show that these games have a value which can be characterized as a viscosity solution to a fully non-linear variational PDE. Furthermore we derive a dual representation of the value function in terms of a minimization procedure. This representation allows under some additional assumptions to determine optimal strategies for the informed player.
Introduction
In this paper we consider a Dynkin game with incomplete information. The game starts at time 0 and ends at time T paying off a certain terminal payoff. In between the players can choose to stop the game and recieve a certain payment dependent on who stopped the game first. However with regard to the payoffs stopping might be less favourable for them than waiting for the other one to stop the game or the game to terminate. We assume that the game is played by two players. One player is informed about the payoffs, while the other one only knows them with a certain probability (p i ) i∈{1,...,I} . Furthermore we assume that the players observe each other during the game so the uninformed player will try to guess his missing information. Games with this kind of information incompleteness have been introduced by Aumann and Maschler (see [2] ) in discrete time setting. Differential games and stochastic differential games with incomplete information in their spirit have been considered in Cardaliaguet and Rainer [8] , who give a characterization of the value function in terms of a fully non linear partial differential equation. As in the case of stochastic differential games with incomplete information studied by Cardaliaguet and Rainer [8] , we allow the players to use an additional randomization device. We note that randomized stopping times have already been used in Touzi and Vieille [25] and Laraki and Solan [20] in a different context. As a result even if the informed player knows the exact state of nature he might not stop when it is optimal to stop for him in order to preserve his information advantage. It turns out that as in the discrete time setting of Aumann and Maschler the randomization device can be interpreted as a certain minimal martingale with a state space in the probability measures on {1, . . . I}. With the optimal measure this representation then allows to determine optimal strategies for the informed agent. This result has been generalized to differential games by Cardaliaguet and Rainer in [7] and to stochastic differential games by the author in [16] . A similar technique of minimization over martingale measures is introduced in De Meyer [11] to determine optimal strategies for informed agents in a financial market. In this paper we extend the previous results to the framework of Dynkin games. We show that the value function of Dynkin games with information incompleteness exists and is determined by a solution to a fully non-linear second order variational partial differential equation. We use the latter characterization in order to establish a dual representation of the value via a minimization procedure over some martingale measures. This representation then allowsunder some additional assumptions -to derive optimal strategies for the informed player. Dynkin games were introduced by E. Dynkin in [12] as a gametheoretical version of an optimal stopping problem. Ever since there has been a vast variety of results obtained by using analytical or purely probabilistic tools. As we are considering continuous time Dynkin games with a diffusion as underlying dynamic we would notably like to mention the works of Bensoussan and Friedman [3] and Friedman [15] who were the first to connect Dynkin games to solutions of second order variational partial differential equations. For for a probabilistic approach we refer to Alario-Nazaret, Lepeltier and Marchal [1] , Bismut [4] , Ekström and Peskir [13] , Eckström and Villeneuve [14] , Lepeltier and Maingueneau [22] , Morimoto [23] , Stettner [24] and the recent work of Kobylanski, Quenez et de Campagnolle [19] . In combination with controlled diffusions also BSDE methods were applied by Cvitanic and Karatzas [10] and Hamadène and Lepeltier [18] . Though the extension of the current paper to Dynkin games, where also the drift of the diffusion is controlled, might seem rather straight forward there are some subtleties to consider. Especially when generalizing the BSDE approach of [16] to an approach with reflected BSDE we have to take into account that for the well-posedness of reflected BSDE as in Hamadène and Lepeltier [18] or Hamadène and Hassani [17] one basically needs that p is continuous. This however implies a severe restriction on the set of martingale measures P(t, p), making it impossible to just follow the proofs in [16] . Of course our way to consider information incompleteness is rather specific and far from being the only way to model Dynkin games with incomplete information. A very interesting paper with a completely different ansatz is the recent work of Lempa and Matomäki [21] .
2 Description of the game
Canonical setup and standing assumptions
Let C([0, T ]; R d ) be the set of continuous functions from R to R d , which are constant on (−∞, 0] and on [T, +∞). We denote by B s (ω B ) = ω B (s) the coordinate mapping on C([0, T ]; R d ) and define H = (H s ) as the filtration generated by s → B s . We denote H t,s the σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s in C([t, T ]; R d ). Furthermore we provide C([0, T ]; R d ) with the Wiener measure P 0 on (H s ) and we consider the respective filtration augmented by P 0 nullsets without changing the notation.
In the following we investigate a two-player zero-sum differential game starting at a time t ≥ 0 with terminal time T . The dynamic is given by an uncontrolled diffusion on (
Let I ∈ N * and ∆(I) denote the simplex of R I . The objective to optimize is characterized by
(ii) early execution payoffs for Player 2:
(iii) early execution payoffs for Player 1:
which are chosen with probability p = (p i ) i∈{1,...,I} ∈ ∆(I) before the game starts. Player 1 chooses τ ∈ [0, T ] to minimize, Player 2 chooses σ ∈ [0, T ] to maximize the expected payoff:
We assume that both players observe their opponents control. However Player 1 knows which payoff he minimizes, Player 2 just knows the respective probabilities p i for scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
The following will be the standing assumption throughout the paper. (ii) (g i ) i∈{1,...,I} :
Assumption (A)
and
Random stopping times
In Dynkin games both players have the possibility to stop the game with undergoing a certain punishment (early execution payment), so strategies in this case consist of a stopping decision. . We denote the set of admissible stopping times by T (t, T ). In the following we shall omit T in the notation whenever it is obvious.
As in [20] , [25] we allow the players to choose their stopping decision randomly Definition 2.3. A randomized stopping time after time t ∈ [0, T ] is a measurable function
We denote the set of randomized stopping times by T r (t).
..,I} ∈ (T r (t)) I , ν ∈ T r (t) we set for i ∈ {1, . . . , I}
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] . (In the following we will skip the subscript P 0 ⊗ λ ⊗ λ.) Furthermore we set
We note that the information advantage of Player 1 is reflected in (2.8) by having the possibility to choose a randomized stopping time µ i for each state of nature i ∈ {1, . . . , I}.
An example
To illustrate the importance of not immediately revealing the information advantage we would like to conclude this section with a basic deterministic example. Assume that the game takes place between times t = 0 and T = 1. There are two possible states of nature i = 1, 2 picked with probability (p, 1 − p) before the game starts. They are associated to the two payoff functionals
Player 1, who is informed about the actual state of nature, chooses τ ∈ [0, 1] to minimize and Player 2 chooses σ ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the payoff functional. However Player 2 is not informed whether it is J 1 or J 2 he has to optimize. Now if the informed player plays a revealing strategy: he immediately stops the game i.e. τ = 0, if i = 1 is picked, and the payoff is J 1 (0, σ) = 1. In case i = 2 he does not stop, i.e. τ = 1, for i = 2. Player 2 does not know i a priori, but if he sees that the revealing Player 1 does not stop he can be sure i = 2, hence the information advantage is lost. In this case it is optimal for Player 2 to stop immediately which yields the payoff J 2 (τ, 0) = 2. So the overall payoff for a revealing strategy of Player 1 would be pJ 1 (0, σ)
On the other hand if Player 1 plays non-revealing, that means acting as if he does not know i, both player face a stopping game with payoff
where only p ∈ [0, 1] is known to both players. For p < 1 7 the uninformed player in his turn will stop immediately. Hence in this case, we have an overall payoff of pJ 1 (τ, 0) + (1 − p)J 2 (τ, 0) = 2 − 3p, which is indeed smaller than the revealing case. As we see later in section 6.3. in general a mixing of randomly revealing and non-revealing strategies will be optimal for the informed player.
Value of the game
For any (t, x, p) ∈ [0, T ] × R d × ∆(I) we define the lower value function by
and the upper value function by 
To show that the game has a value we establish:
the value of the game is given by
Remark 3.3. Note that by definition V + (t, x, p) ≥ V − (t, x, p).
To establish V + (t, x, p) ≤ V − (t, x, p) we will show that V + is a viscosity subsolution and V − a viscosity supersolution to a nonlinear obstacle problem. More precisely we define the differential operator
, where for all p ∈ ∆(I), A ∈ S I (where S I denotes the set of symmetric I × I matrices)
Az, z |z| 2 .
and T ∆(I)(p) denotes the tangent cone to ∆(I) at p, i.e. T ∆(I)(p) = ∪ λ>0 (∆(I) − p)/λ.
Remark 3.4. Note that since by (2.5), (2.6) the obstacles are separated, we one can consider as in the classical case (3.5) as 
at (t,x,p). This is equivalent to: 
at (t,x,p). This is equivalent to: if
An essential part of the proof of Theorem 3.2. is given by the following comparison result. We postpone the proof to the appendix. 
for all x ∈ R d , p ∈ ∆(I). Then 
Then we have
Since
the claim follows with assumption (A) by standard estimates, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. The case V + (t, x, p) < V + (t ′ , x, p) follows by similar arguments.
The following is a key property in games with incomplete information (see [2] ). Our proof follows closely [8] .
Proof: That V − (t, x, p) is convex in p can be easily seen by the following reformulation
To show that
respectively. Then as in [8] Proposition 2.1. one can construct aμ ∈ (T r (t)) I , such that for any ν ∈ T r (t) we have that
Maximizing over ν ∈ T r (t) (4.4) yields then
and the result follows since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
Furthermore from the very definition of V + , V − we have the following:
Subdynamic programming principle for
For any j ∈ N, choose a y j ∈ A j and µ j ∈ (T r (t)) I ǫ-optimal for V + (t, y j ,p). Furthermore chooseμ ∈ (T r (t, t)) I to be ǫ optimal for inf µ∈(T r (t)) I sup σ∈T (t)
We shall build withμ and (µ j ) j∈N a randomized stopping timeμ ∈ (T r (t)) I in the following wayμ
First note that for any σ ∈ T (t).
while by the uniform Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients by (A) and of V + by Proposition 4.1. we have for a generic constant c > 0
Hence combining (4.8) with (4.10) and (4.11) and choosingσ ∈ T (t) to be ǫ-optimal for V + (t,x,p) (3.3) we get
The claim follows since ǫ and δ can be chosen arbitrarily small.
In contrast to the subdynamic programming for V + a superdynamic programming principle for V − can not be derived directly. As in [8] we are led to consider the convex conjugate.
Convex conjugate of V
− and implications
Then by [6] there exists a δ, η > 0 such that for all p ∈ ∆(I), (t,
Consequently, for anyp
which implies by choosingp = ∂φ ∂p (t, x,p)
and for (t, x) = (t,x) with (4.15)
Note that (4.15) and (4.16) imply in particular:
exists at (t,x,p) and is equal top.
Subdynamic programming principle for
Instead of a superdynamic programming principle for V − we can with regard to (4.16) show a subdynamic programming principle for (V − ) * . To that end the following reformulation of (V − ) * will be useful.
We recall:
Remark 4.7. Again as in Remark 2.1. we can rewrite (4.18) as
Proof: Denote w(t, x,p) the right hand side of (4.18). Since V − is convex in p we have that
Hence it suffices to prove w * = V − . First we show convexity of w inp. To that end letp,p 1 ,p 2 ∈ R I , λ ∈ (0, 1) such thatp = λp 1 + (1 − λ)p 2 . Chooseν 1 ,ν 2 ǫ-optimal for w(t, x,p 1 ), w(t, x,p 2 ) respectively. Furthermore define as in [8] aν ∈ T r (t) such that for all µ ∈ T r (t)
Then for all µ ∈ T r (t)
The convexity follows then by choosingμ ǫ-optimal for w(t, x,p). Next we calculate w * . By definition of the convex conjugate we have
where the supremum is attained forp j = inf µ∈T r (t) J j (t, x, µ, ν). Hence
As a direct consequence of (4.18) we have:
Furthermore we have with (4.18) as in Proposition 4.1.:
is uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x andp and Hölder continuous in t.
Now we can establish a subdynamic programming principle.
Proof:
For any j ∈ N, choose a y j ∈ A j and ν j ∈ T r (t) ǫ-optimal for (V − ) * (t, y j ,p). Furthermore fix someσ ∈ T (t, t) ǫ-optimal for the right hand side of (4.22).
We shall build withσ and (ν j ) j∈N a randomized stopping timeν ∈ T r (t) in the following way:ν
First note that for any τ ∈ T (t) max i∈{1,...,
Furthermore by the uniform Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients by (A) we have for a generic constant c > 0
And since v → max i∈{1,...,I} v i is convex, we have by taking conditional expectation, the fact that Xt ,x is Markovian and the choice ofν in (4.24) which yields with the Lipschitz property of (V − ) * in x by Proposition 4.6.
(44) Letτ ∈ T (t) be ǫ-optimal for (V − ) * (t,x,p) (4.18) then combining (4.24) with (4.25) we get
The claim follows since ǫ and δ can be chosen arbitrarily small. Proof:
Because of the convexity of V + by Proposition 4.2. and sincep ∈ Int(∆(I)) we have
So it remains to show
at (t,x,p). Note that by Proposition 4.3. we already have
So it remains to show that for
, which is just a classical consequence of the subdynamic programming principle for V + . Indeed if we set τ = t in the dynamic programming (4.22) we have for an ǫ(t −t) optimal σ ǫ ∈ T (t)
If we now assume
then there exists h, δ > 0 such that for all (s, 
Furthermore note that for 1 ≥ (t −t) we have that
So
h 4 , which gives with (5.4)
which yields a contradiction, since (t −t) and ǫ can be choosen arbitrarily small. 
Supersolution property of
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) = max i∈{1,...,I} {p i − g i (x)}.
We are now using Theorem 4.2 to conclude the supersolution property for V − .
Theorem 5.3. V − is a viscosity supersolution to (3.5).
Proof: Assume that p = e i for an i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, where e i denotes the i-th coordinate vector in R I . Then (5.9) reduces to the PDE for a game with complete information, i.e.
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) = g i (x) and the result is standard.
at (t,x,p). If
at (t,x,p) (5.11) obviously holds. So assume
Note that by Proposition 4.3. we have that V + (t,x,p)− f (t,x), p = φ(t,x,p)− f (t,x),p ≥ 0. So to show (5.11) it remains to show, that for φ(t,x,p) < h(t, x), p , we have that
Recall that (5.12) implies by Lemma 4.5. that (V − ) * (t,x,p) is differentiable atp := ∂φ ∂p (t,x,p) with a derivative equal to
Indeed we have strict inequality in (5.14) forp ∈ {e i , i = 1, . . . , I}. Assume that
Since max i∈{1,...,I} {p i − h i (t,x)} is convex inp, we would have that max i∈{1,...,I} {p i − h i (t,x)} is also differentiable atp with a derivative equal to
=p. However the mapp ′ → max i∈{1,...,I} {p ′ i − h i (t,x)} is only differentiable at points for which there is a unique i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , I} such that max i∈{1,...,
) and in this case its derivative is given by e i 0 . This is impossible sincep = e i 0 . Therefore
holds, which implies with (4.16)
If we now recall the dynamic programming for (V − ) * with setting σ = t, i.e.
we have with the upper bound of (V − ) * (5.16) that (V − ) * has the viscosity subsolution property to
at (t,x,p). And as in [6] V − has the viscosity supersolution property to (5.19) at (t,x,p), hence (5.13) holds. 
Viscosity solution property of the value function

Alternative representation
In a second part we use the PDE characterization to establish a representation of the value function via a minimization procedure over certain martingale measures. To do so we enlarge the canonical Wiener space to a space which carries besides a Brownain motion B a new dynamic p. We use this additional dynamic to model the incorporation of the private information into the game. More precisely we model the probability in which scenario the game is played in according to the information of the uninformed Player 2.
Enlargement of the canonical space
To 
In the following we shall, whenever we work under a fixed probability P on Ω, complete the filtration F with P-nullsets without changing the notation.
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T we denote Ω t = D([t, T ]; ∆(I)) × C([t, T ]; R d ) and F t,s the (right-continuous)
σ-algebra generated by paths up to time s ≥ t in Ω t . Furthermore we define the space
If r ∈ (t, T ] and ω ∈ Ω t then let
and denote πω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ). The map π : Ω t → Ω t,r × Ω r induces the identification Ω t = Ω t,r × Ω r moreover ω = π −1 (ω 1 , ω 2 ), where the inverse is defined in an evident way.
For any measure P on Ω, we denote by E P [·] the expectation with respect to P. We equip Ω with a certain class of measures.
Definition 6.1. Given p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [0, T ], we denote by P(t, p) the set of probability measures P on Ω such that, under P (i) p is a martingale, such that p s = p ∀s < t, p s ∈ {e i , i = 1, . . . , I} ∀s ≥ T P-a.s., where e i denotes the i-th coordinate vector in R I , and p T is independent of (B s ) s∈(−∞,T ] ,
(ii) (B s ) s∈[0,T ] is a Brownian motion.
Comment 6.2. Assumption (ii) is naturally given by the Brownian structure of the game. Assumption (i) is motivated as follows. Before the game starts the information of the uninformed player is just the initial distribution p. The martingale property, implying p t = E P [p T |F t ], is due to the best guess of the uninformed player about the scenario he is in. Finally, at the end of the game the information is revealed hence p T ∈ {e i , i = 1, . . . , I} and since the scenario is picked before the game starts the outcome p T is independent of the Brownian motion.
Auxiliary games and representation
From now on we will consider stopping times on the enlarged space . We denote the set of admissible stopping times byT (t, T ).
In the following we shall omit T in the notation whenever it is obvious.
We note that in contrast to Definition 2.2. the admissible stopping times at time t might now also depend on the paths of the Brownian motion before time t.
One can now consider a stopping game with this additional dynamic, namely with a payoff given by
where τ ∈T (t) denotes the stopping time choosen by Player 1, who minimizes, and σ ∈T (t) denotes the stopping time choosen by Player 2, who maximizes the expected outcome. In contrast to the previous consideration here we are only working with non randomized stopping times. Indeed the randomization is in some sense shifted to the additional dynamic p.
Note that the known results in literature do not imply that these games have a value for any fixed P ∈ P(t, p), i.e.
esssup σ∈T (t) essinf τ ∈T (t) J(t, x, τ, σ, P) t− = essinf τ ∈T (t) esssup σ∈T (t) J(t, x, τ, σ, P) t− .
Indeed since p is only assumed to be càdlàg the theorems of [18] or [17] requiring basically the continuity of p do not apply. For us however it is for now not important since our first goal is an alternative representation of the value function, for which we have a PDE representation. Since p can be interpreted as a manipulation of the uninformed player by the informed one the outcome of the game should be some minimum in this manipulation.
Note that all P ∈ P(t, p) are equal on F t− , i.e. the distribution of (B s , p s ) on [0, t) is given by δ(p) ⊗ P 0 , where δ(p) is the measure under which p is constant and equal to p and P 0 is the Wiener measure on Ω 0,t . So we can identify each P ∈ P(t, p) on F t− with a common probability measure Q and define Q-a.s. the lower value function
and the upper value function
where by definition we have W − (t, x, p) ≤ W + (t, x, p).
Furthermore the value of the Dynkin game with incomplete information can be written as
To prove the theorem we establish a subdynamic programming for W + and a superdynamic programming principle for W − . Then we show that W + is a subsolution and W − a supersolution to the PDE (3.5). After establishing that W + and W − are bounded, uniformly continuous functions, which are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in p, the comparison result Theorem 3.7. gives us the equalities (6.5) and (6.6).
Optimal strategies for the informed player
The motivation for the alternative representation is that, as in [7] , [16] it allows to determine optimal strategies for the informed player. Indeed, if we assume that there exists aP ∈ P(t, p), such that
then we can define for any scenario i ∈ {1, . . . , I} a probability measureP i by: for all A ∈ F we have thatP
It is clear by Definition 6.1. that B is still a Brownian motion under P i . We note that the right-continuity of p allows to define the stopping time τ * = inf{s
, p } is a closed set by the continuity of V and g. The couple (τ * ,P i ) then defines a randomized stopping time for the first player. Indeed, for each state of nature i ∈ {1, . . . , I} the informed player stops when (s, X t,x s , p s ) enters D underP i , where X t,x is the diffusion both players observe and p underP i represents his own randomization device. Theorem 6.5. For any scenario i = 1, . . . , I and any stopping time of the uninformed player σ ∈T (t) playing (τ * ,P i ) is optimal for the informed player in the sense that
(71)
Proof: By definition ofP i we have
while, since p is a martingale, we have by conditioning
(6.8) follows then with (6.7) by standard results.
The functions W + , W − and ǫ-optimal martingale measures
We conclude this section with some important technical remarks. Note that by its very definition W + (t, x, p) and W − (t, x, p) are merely F t− measurable random fields. However we can show that they are deterministic and hence a good candidate to represent the deterministic value function V (t, x, p). The proof is mainly based on the methods in [5] using perturbation of C([0, T ]; R d ) with certain elements of the Cameron-Martin space. We already adapted these arguments to the framework of games with incomplete information in [16] . The proof is very similar here and thus omitted.
Hence identifying W + , W − respectively with its deterministic version we can consider W + :
In the following section we establish some regularity results and a dynamic programming principle. To this end we work with ǫ-optimal measures. Note that since we are taking the essential infimum over a family of random variables, existence of an ǫ-optimal P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) is as in [16] not standard. Therefore we provide a technical lemma, the proof of which can be provided along the lines of [5] , [16] respectively.
there is an ǫ-optimal P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) in the sense that Q-a.s.
For technical reasons we furthermore introduce the set P f (t, p) as the set of all measures P ∈ P(t, p), such that there exists a finite set S ⊂ ∆(I) with p s ∈ S P-a.s. for all s ∈ [t, T ].
Remark 6.8. Note that for any (t,
we can choose an ǫ-optimal P ǫ in the smaller class P f (t, p). The idea of the proof is as follows: first choose ǫ 2 -optimal measure P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) for W − (t, x, p). Since p progressively measurable we can approximate it by an elementary processesp ǫ , such that one has
whereP ǫ distribution of (B,p ǫ ). The same argument works for W + .
7 Dynamic programming for W + , W − 7.1 Regularity properties
Observe that this can be understood as identifying Ω with Ω × {1, 2} with weights λ and (1 − λ) for Ω × {1} and Ω × {2}, respectively. So
and the convexity follows by taking expectation, since ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. The proof for W − follows by similar arguments.
Proposition 7.2. W + (t, x, p) and W − (t, x, p) are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x and p and Hölder continuous in t.
Proof: The proof of Lipschitz continuity in x is straightforward, while the Hölder continuity in t can be shown as in Proposition 4.1. and Proposition 4.6. in [16] . It remains to prove the uniform Lipschitz continuity in p. Since we have convexity in p, it is sufficient to establish the Lipschitz continuity with respect to p on the extreme points e i . Observe that P(t, e i ) consists in the single probability measure δ(e i ) ⊗ P 0 , where δ(e i ) is the measure under which p is constant and equal to e i and P 0 is a Wiener measure. Assume W + (t, x, e i )− W + (t, x, p) > 0. For ǫ > 0 let P ǫ ∈ P(t, p) be ǫ-optimal for W + (t, x, p).
Choose nowτ ∈T (t) to be ǫ-optimal for essinf τ ∈T (t) esssup σ∈T (t) J(t, x, τ, σ, P ǫ ) t− andσ ∈ T (t) to be ǫ-optimal for esssup σ∈T (t) J(t, x,τ , σ, , δ(e i ) ⊗ P 0 )) t− . Then we have with (7.1)
Since for all p ∈ ∆(I) 0 ≤ |p − e i | ≤ c(1 − p i ) we have by the boundedness of the coefficients with (7.2) and the fact that p is a P ǫ -martingale with mean p
the claim follows since ǫ can be chosen arbirarily small. The case W + (t, x, p)−W + (t, x, e i ) > 0 is immediate. The Lipschitz continuity of W − in p can be established by similar arguments.
Subdynamic programming for
Proof: Let P ∈ P f (t, p), t ∈ [t, T ]. By assumption there exist S = {p 1 , . . . , p k }, such that P[p t− ∈ S] = 1. Furthermore let (A l ) l∈N be a partition of R d by Borel sets, such that diam(A l ) ≤ǭ and choose for any l ∈ N some y l ∈ A l .
Define for any l, m measures P l,m ∈ P f (t, p m ), such that they are ǫ-optimal for W + (t, p m , y l ) and ǫ-optimal stopping times τ l,m . We define the probablility measure P ǫ , such that on
where for all A ∈ B(Ω t ):
and the stopping timeτ
Furthermore the remaining conditions of Definition 6.1. are obviously met, hence P ǫ ∈ P f (t, p). By the definition of W + we have
Note that using the Lipschitz continuity of W + we have for any σ ∈T (t)
Hence we have with (7.6)
t , p t− )1 {σ=τ =t} |F t− + 2cδ + 2ǫ. Now choosing P, τ ∈T (t, t) such that they are ǫ optimal for the right hand side of (7.3) gives the desired result.
Superdynamic programming for
(78)
Proof: We choose a P ǫ ∈ P f (t,p) to be ǫ-optimal for W − (t,x,p),
By assumption there exist S = {p 1 , . . . , p k }, such that P ǫ [p t− ∈ S] = 1. Furthermore let (A l ) l∈N be a partition of R d by Borel sets, such that diam(A l ) ≤ǭ and choose for any l ∈ N some y l ∈ A l . With the help of P ǫ define P l,m as
where δ(p m ) denotes the measure under which p is constant and equal to p m , P 0 is a Wiener measure on Ω 0,t and for all A ∈ B(Ω t )
Furthermore define stopping times σ l,m ∈T (t) which are ǫ-optimal for
which implies that for all τ ∈T (t)
Note that using the Lipschitz continuity of the coefficients and W − and the definition ofσ and P l,m we have for any τ ∈T (t)
This gives with (7.12) for any σ ∈T (t, t)
(85) So in particular when choosingσ ǫ-optimal for
and the claim follows by taking the essential infimum in P ∈ P(t,p) since δ and ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. 
at (t,x,p). By Proposition 7.2 W + is convex in p. So sincep ∈ Int(∆(I)), we have that
So it remains to show, that
at (t,x,p). Note that the subdynamic programming for W + implies for P = P 0 ⊗ δ(p) in particular 
with terminal condition w(T, x, p) = i=1,...,I p i g i (x). 
at (t,x,p) (8.5) obviously holds. So we assume in the subsequent steps strict convexity of φ in p at (t,x,p), i.e. there exist δ, η > 0 such that for all z ∈ T ∆(I)(p)
Since φ is a test function for a purely local viscosity notion, one can modify it outside a neighborhood of (t,x,p) such that for all (s, x) ∈ [t, T ] × R d the function φ(s, x, ·) is convex on the whole convex domain ∆(I). Thus for any p ∈ ∆(I) we have that
Step 1: Estimate for p. As in (4.14) we have with (8.6) a stronger estimate, namely there exist δ, η > 0 such that for all p ∈ ∆(I), t ∈ [t,t + η], x ∈ B η (x)
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1. we can set in the dynamic programming for W − σ = t to get
So for ǫ(t −t)-optimal P ǫ ∈ P f (t, p) and a ǫ(t −t)-optimal stopping time τ ǫ we have
. Using (8.7) and (8.8) we get since W − (t,x,p) = φ(t,x,p)
Now by Itô's formula and since the derivatives of φ are uniformly bounded we have that
Next, let f : [t, t] × R n → R n be a smooth bounded function, with bounded derivatives.
Recall that under any P ∈ P f (t,p) the process p is strongly orthogonal to B. So since under P ǫ the process p is a martingale with E P ǫ [p τ ǫ − |Ft − ] =p, we have by Itô's formula that
Hence by the assumption on the coefficients of the diffusion (A)(i)
Furthermore observe that, since |p τ ǫ − −p| ≤ 1, we have, that for ǫ ′ > 0 by Young and Hölder inequality
Choosing 0 < ǫ ′ < η and combining (8.11) with the estimates (8.12)-(8.14) there exists a constant c, such that
This implies in particular for h > 0 by Doob's inequality
Step 2: Viscosity supersolution property To show the viscosity supersolution property we have to show that
We will argue by contradiction. Assume that
Then there exist h, δ > 0 such that for all (s, x, p)
By the Itô formula we have, that
where we used the fact that by the convexity of φ we have P ǫ -a.s., that we have that
Now we can continue as in the proof of Theorem 5.1. By using (8.19) we get
Dividing by (t −t) we have
However (8.22) contradicts δ > 0, since ǫ and t −t can be chosen arbitrarily small. The proof of Theorem 6.4 is now straightforward using the subsolution property of W + , the supersolution property of W − and the comparison result of Theorem 3.7.
Appendix: Comparison
In this section we provide the proof of the comparison result Theorem 3.7. for the fully non linear variational PDE (3. 
Reduction to the faces
LetĨ ⊂ {1, . . . , I} and we define the set ∆(Ĩ) by ∆(Ĩ) = {p ∈ ∆(I) :
Note that by Definition 3.3. the supersolution property is obviously preserved under restriction. We just state 
with φ ǫ (t, x, p) = φ(t, x, Π(p)) + 2(k + 1) µ, p − ǫσ(p) and σ(p) = j ∈Ĩ ln(p i (1 − p i )). For ǫ sufficiently small this problem has a maximum (t ǫ , x ǫ , p ǫ ) which converges to (t,x,p) as ǫ ↓ 0. By the definition of σ and the fact that p ∈ Int(∆(Ĩ)) we have that p ǫ ∈ Int(∆(I)). Hence by the subsolution property of w we have, that λ min p ǫ , 
by letting ǫ ↓ 0.
So for β, δ ↓ 0 (t,s,x,ỹ,p,q) converges (up to subsequences) to some (t,s,x,ȳ,p,p), where (t,s,x,ȳ,p) is a maximum point of (9.12). Hence for β, δ sufficiently small we have that p,q ∈ Int(∆(I)).
From the usual maximum principle (see e.g. [9] ) we have that: for all σ ∈ (0, 1) there exist X 1 , X 2 ∈ S d , P 1 , P 2 ∈ S I such that on [0, T ] 2 × R 2d × T I with T I = {z ∈ R I : i z i = 0} we have t −s ǫ − η,x −ỹ ǫ + αx,p −q δ − βp, X 1 , P 1 | T I ) ∈D 1,2,2,− w 1 (t,x,p) and t −s ǫ ,x −ỹ ǫ − αỹ,p −q δ + βq, X 2 , P 2 | T I ∈D 1,2,2,+ w 2 (s,ỹ,q) with diag
where
Note that
Since w 1 is a viscosity subsolution to (3.5) we have λ min (p, P 1 ) ≥ 0.
And sincep ∈ Int(∆(I)), this yields with (9.16) to λ min (q, P 2 ) > 0.
Furthermore since w 1 is a viscosity subsolution and w 2 is a viscosity supersolution we have w 1 (t,x,p) ≤ h(t,x),p w 2 (s,ỹ,q) ≥ f (s,ỹ),q ,
which yields for ǫ, α, η, δ, β small enough with (9.11) w 1 (t,x,p) > f (t,x),p w 2 (s,ỹ,q) < h(s,ỹ),q .
So again using the subsolution property of w 1 and the supersolution property of w 2 we have with 
Now using (9.15) and (9.16) in (9.21) yields a contradiction for ǫ, α, η sufficiently small as in the standard case (see [9] ).
